A Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) is one where nodes can be highly mobile, with long message delay times forming dynamic and fragmented networks. Traditional centralised network security is difficult to implement in such a network, therefore distributed security solutions are more desirable in DTN implementations. Establishing effective trust in distributed systems with no centralised Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) such as the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) scheme usually requires human intervention. Our aim is to build and compare different decentralised trust systems for implementation in autonomous DTN systems. In this paper, we utilise a key distribution model based on the Web of Trust principle, and employ a simple leverage of common friends trust system to establish initial trust in autonomous DTN's. We compare this system with two other methods of autonomously establishing initial trust by introducing a malicious node and measuring the distribution of malicious and fake keys. Our results show that the new trust system not only mitigates the distribution of fake malicious keys by 40% at the end of the simulation, but it also improved key distribution between nodes. This paper contributes a comparison of three de-centralised trust systems that can be employed in autonomous DTN systems.
Introduction

Recent applications of Delay Tolerant or Disruption Tolerant Networks (DTN) in Mobile
Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETS) (Omar et al., 2009) , interplanetary space networks (Farrell and Cahill, 2006; Fall, 2003; Burleigh et al., 2003) , frontline battlefield networking (Jia et al., 2012) and vehicular networks (Fall, 2003; Lin et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2009b) , have shown that applying traditional network security practices are unsuitable for DTN. In traditional networks such as the Internet, it is assumed that there is a complete and continuous source to destination path, with low delay times and low probability of packet loss (Zhu et al., 2009a) . PKI, are easily implemented to help with creating secure communication channels. Low delay times for messages allow the negotiation of session keys to facilitate a secure channel for message transfer between the source and destination nodes. In contrast, DTN have long delay times and a high probability for packet loss (Fall, 2003) . Nodes can be highly mobile, with dynamic connections to neighbouring nodes within communications range. These characteristics produce a network that is dynamic and highly fragmented, with message transfer taking the form of a store-carry and forward scheme as presented in Guo et al. (2010) . Exchanging of session keys similar to a Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) scheme in a DTN would result in long delays. Therefore, schemes like SSL/TLS are infeasible in such environments.
An example scenario is of a vehicular network in a dense urban city. Smart vehicles with individual sensors can report on telemetry such as local weather conditions, traffic status and also act as data mules between remote towns. These vehicles then communicate through wireless radio to other vehicles in the vicinity to share data and transfer messages. As vehicles drive in and out of town they act as data mules for developing towns and villages with limited connectivity. Due to the large geographical area such a network may cover, it is unreasonable to assume that PKI is available to establish an initial secure context between the vehicles. Therefore the security of key management in a DTN is still an open problem.
Key distribution is important in both WSN and DTN networks as they provide the mechanism to establish a confidential channel between nodes. Different key distribution schemes such as Perrig et al. (2002) and Basagni et al. (2001) , help establish secure channels between nodes. Key distribution provides a hard security mechanism, that provides all or no access (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997) . In comparison, soft security models (Rasmusson et al., 1996) such as trust systems and trust management look at a social control model (Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 1997) . The trust between two or more entities can allow nodes in a DTN to distinguish between compromised malicious nodes and uncompromised nodes. This paper extends the key distribution scheme proposed by Jia et al. (2012) . The contributions of this paper is the use of a trust system to assist the key distribution scheme of Jia et al. (2012) for autonomous nodes. It focuses on the initial secure context of nodes being deployed in a new environment, in particular how to distribute keys without a centralised PKI party involved as in Wu et al. (2007) . The distributed model is more robust and resilient in comparison to a centralised trust model, which can present a single point of failure in the network. In a distributed model, each node is responsible for its own security and the security of the entire network. This architecture eliminates a common point of failure in the trusted third party such as a CA. This paper also contributes by comparing trust and reputations systems during the bootstrapping process (The initial key sharing period of a DTN). Past implementations of reputation systems such as EigenTrust (Kamvar et al., 2003) and PeerTrust (Xiong and Liu, 2004 ) rely on previous history of actions to determine the reputation of a node. However in the bootstrapping process, there is no history of actions to provide a trustworthy rating for each node. Jia et al. (2012) used a model that assigned a random trust value to each node upon first encounter. This paper assists the proposal of Jia et al. (2012) by utilising a trust system, which leverages common contacts. It is also shown that assigning a random trust value provides very little security against the introduction of a malicious node. The authors of this paper evaluate the addition of a trust system by measuring two properties. The first being how the trust system affects key distribution efficiency, or the speed at which keys are distributed. The second being what additional security does the trust system provide to the key distribution scheme. This is achieved by introducing malicious nodes.
In section 2 we will outline the related works examining DTN, and the security challenges that are still present, public key cryptography and how it is relevant to distributed and unmanaged DTN. We also discuss in detail the work conducted by Jia et al. (2012) . An overview of trust and reputation systems, and how these systems are either centrally managed (like a PKI or CA) or distributed as in the case of a Web of Trust (Zimmermann, 1995) . Section 3 will outline a new initial trust system that leverages common friends. Section 4 outlines the simulation and methodology, along with the parameters used in the experiments. It will describe the simulation engine constructed, and the introduction of a malicious node to see the resilience and performance of such a network when under attack. Section 5 and 6 presents the results and discussion of the various experiments. Section 7 concludes on the results and proposes future work that has yet to be undertaken.
Related Work
DTN characteristics such as long delay paths, frequent disconnections and mobility (Fall, 2003; Galati, 2010) , have seen traditional Internet security methods rendered impractical. Techniques such as SSL/TLS become impractical when frequent communication disruptions hinder session key establishment. Along with examples of practical applications of DTN taking the form of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETS) (Fall, 2003; Lin et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2009b) , and interplanetary networks (Fall, 2003; Burleigh et al., 2003) , it has become important to provide security in these vulnerable networks.
Many DTN security schemes have been proposed as follows. Secure routing for messages between intermediate nodes was presented in Wood et al. (2009 ), Guo et al. (2010 and Hui et al. (2011) , with a more specific application to VANETS in Lu et al. (2010) . Lu et al. (2010) also exploited social contacts for message forwarding and was able to achieve privacy preservation. By exploiting social contacts, Defrawy et al. (2009) also proposes a solution to the initial secure context establishment. With the assumption that no reliable PKI is available, Defrawy et al. (2009) leverages social contacts to match a node to a more prominent entity such as a university or library where nodes can then receive public keys. They also outline how to provide confidentiality and authentication for messages transferred through their scheme. Hui et al. (2011) also proposed a social based forwarding scheme called BUBBLE, while a credit based incentive for nodes to transfer messages was presented in Zhu et al. (2009a) . DTN networks without a centralised PKI (Seth and Keshav, 2005) have employed identity based cryptography. This is when source nodes generate encryption that is tied to the destination node from associated information such a public library or university. Proposals such as Seth and Keshav (2005) , Kate et al. (2007) , and Patra et al. (2008) have utilised identity based cryptography to provide security in a DTN. However the disadvantages of employing an identity based cryptography scheme presents difficulty in revoking private keys, and introducing key escrow. An analysis into the applicability of identity based cryptography in DTN systems by Asokan et al. (2007) found that for authentication it had no significant advantage over traditional cryptography. Because of this, we utilise traditional cryptography for our distributed DTN system. The use of threshold cryptography based on the threshold scheme by Shamir (1979) was outlined by Omar et al. (2009) . The authors investigated a distributed security for MANETS. Employing a similar trust propagation model as PGP (Abdul-Rahman, 1997), individual nodes generate, store, sign and distribute their own certificates similar to Capkun et al. (2003) . The performance and effectiveness of the scheme proposed by Omar et al. (2009) was measured by introducing internal malicious nodes to falsify certificates and determine the rate of successful certification. We use a similar methodology to Omar et al. (2009) in measuring the performance and effectiveness of our proposed scheme.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a framework to provide data encryption, and authentication which was created by Phil Zimmermann in 1991. It encompasses several security technologies including hybrid key cryptography, the utilisation of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography for performance, and a Web of Trust model of trust (Zimmermann, 1995) . The Web of Trust is a decentralised trust model of public keys, where the generated keys are associated with the identity of the user, and is digitally signed by others in the web as an endorsement that the key corresponds to the user. The system is very flexible and can utilise various degrees of trust. Keys can be assigned a trust value from the set of: These trust settings require human intervention to define how each individual differentiates between the categories such as Trust Marginally to Fully Trust. Rules can be set to allow any number of partially trusted key endorsers be required to trust a key. The necessity for humans to establish trust for PGP becomes infeasible for autonomous systems such as VANETS. The distributed key model of PGP require users to be responsible for the management of the keys they own and receive from other users. In contrast to the public keys of PGP, X.509 certificates allows each certificate to be signed only by a CA, in a hierarchical based structure. The CA model delegates the responsibility of trust to the centralised CA and is widely used for SSL/TLS Internet communications. However this architecture of trust is difficult for use in a DTN due to frequent fragmentation of the network.
2.1. Jia et al. (2012 ) Jia et al. (2012 outlined that sharing keying material in a DTN where PKI is unavailable is still an open problem. The authors proposed the use of a similar key distribution to PGP with varying levels of trust and utilising two channel cryptography techniques to prevent spoofing of keys during key transfer. Nodes generate their own public/private key pair similar to Rivest et al. (1978) and move in close geographical proximity to each other. Each node exchanges public keys with one another, and stores, carries and forwards public keys. The key distribution is implemented through two channel cryptography. Node A and B are connected and want to exchange public keys. Node A selects a random key x and computes s, a hash of the public key keyed with x s = Hx(PubKey A). It then sends over a wireless channel to Node B the Public Key of A, and the random key x. It also sends over the second channel s. Node B receives the packages over both channels and computes its own version of s (s' ) from the Public Key of A and the random key x. If s' is equal to s, the message was authentic.
The public keys of each node are exchanged by meeting other nodes, forming the highest trust level, direct trust. Keys in the direct key list are easily verifiable as they were received from the node that owns the public key. As nodes are highly mobile, they receive the public keys of various other nodes, becoming carriers. These carried keys, belonging to other nodes are also distributed forming indirect trust relationships between nodes. This follows the Web of Trust principle: If Alice trusts Bob, and Bob trusts Carol, then Alice can indirectly trust Carol.
An example of this scenario is when Alice meets Bob, they both exchange the keys they own. Alice has Bob's public key in her direct keys list, and Bob now has Alice's public key in his direct key list. Some time later, Alice meets Carol and exchange public keys. Carol now has Alice's public key in her direct key list. Alice has two public keys in her direct key list, the keys of Bob and Carol. Since Alice has met Bob and exchanged keys, she now carries Bob's key and passes it onto Carol.
Because the ownership of carried keys cannot be easily verified in a distributed system in comparison to a centralised architecture, Jia et al. (2012) proposed the use of an approval system. The receiving node may approve or reject the carried key based on the trust value of the carrier node it received the key from. For example, Bob may have received many instances of Carol's key from various other carriers. Bob trusts these carriers with varying degrees of trust. Bob assigns a trust value to each carrier and if the total trust of all carriers is above a threshold, Bob approves Carol's key into the approved key list. Since human reasoning is required to provide the initial trust value of each carrier, the simulation carried out by Jia et al. (2012) utilised randomly generated trust values. Jia et al. (2012) simulate their key distribution scheme using randomly generated values of initial trust in the NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) simulator. Jia et al. (2012) utilises the spread of carrier keys to effectively distribute keys in large scale DTN systems upon deployment. However, the scheme is heavily dependant on either human intervention or a centralised management, since establishing initial trust between autonomous nodes is difficult. The authors of this paper are interested in utilising a distributed key management scheme for autonomous DTN nodes.
The New Trust System -Leverage of Common Friends
In a DTN such as Jia et al. (2012) , nodes move around and can freely connect to other nodes within communications range to exchange and distribute keys. Using the same three tiered trust scheme as Jia et al. (2012) nodes can carry keys in three lists. The first is the direct key list, which is a list of keys that the node has personally met and exchanged public keys. The second is the approved key list, a list of keys that a sufficient number of friends of the node has met. This represents the list of nodes who most likely exist but have not yet been met. The third is the untrusted key list, a list of keys considered untrustworthy as they are below the trust threshold for approval. Figure 1 depicts the public key exchange of two nodes when connected using no trust system. This scenario is the control scenario of the simulations. Upon connection, both nodes flag a connected status and stop moving. In the direct key exchange phase of Figure 1 , Node A sends its public key to Node B, and Node B reciprocates by also sending its public key. Each node then adds the directly received public key to their direct key list. The next phase is the carrier key exchange as shown in Figure 1 . This is when Node A sends the list of nodes it has met in the past, essentially a record of the direct key list. Node B also sends its respective list of nodes. Each node scans the list and finds nodes that are not in the direct or approved key list and adds them to the approved key list. The final phase in the public key exchange process is the disconnection from each other and resuming movement. The second method is the one outlined in Jia et al. (2012) where nodes randomly generate an initial trust value. This leads to an asymmetric trust relationship between the two nodes. Figure 2 depicts the public key exchange with random trust assignment from Jia et al. (2012) . It shows that two additional steps in the public key exchange are required, the first is after the connection stage, both nodes independently randomly generate a trust value for each other. The carrier key exchange process now includes an approval process utilised by Jia et al. (2012) , where trust of carrier nodes is accumulated, and if above the threshold, the carried key is approved.
Leverage of Common Friends Trust System
We build upon the work of Jia et al. (2012) by proposing a distributed trust system to help establish initial trust between nodes. We also introduce a single malicious node to measure the effectiveness and importance of establishing initial trust during the key distribution phase.
Papers such as Farrell and Cahill (2006) , and Jia et al. (2012) , have shown that establishing the initial secure context at deployment is still an open security problem. Trust and reputation systems such as PageRank (Page et al., 1999) and other credit based systems are managed by a central entity. In a distributed DTN, establishing initial secure context is further hindered by the fact that nodes must manage their own keys and trust relationship with other nodes. The use of a trust and reputation system to establish the initial trust between two nodes meeting for the first time requires some sort of past history. Reputation systems proposed by Xiong and Liu (2004) , and Kamvar et al. (2003) , measure the effectiveness and efficiency of nodes when given certain tasks to complete. However in the instance of establishing initial trust when multiple nodes meet for the first time, a past history of task completion does not yet exist.
We propose a new linear simple reputation system called Leverage of Common Friends (LCF), to help establish the initial trust for secure autonomous communications. For the purposes of this paper the authors of this paper use a linear relationship between trust and number of nodes met. Other relationships such as exponential and logarithmic can be used depending on the application of the DTN. Some applications may require the speed of key distribution over time to be as fast as possible, thus following a logarithmic relationship. Other applications may require a more slow and steady key distribution over time, thus utilising an exponential relationship. The authors of this paper use a linear relationship as it allows a moderate distribution of keys that is faster than an exponential relationship, and more steady than a logarithmic relationship. The proposed reputation system leverages common contacts between the two nodes which are meeting for the first time. As seen in Jia et al. (2012) nodes meet and exchange keys similar to the PGP model. Nodes build a web of trust similar to Zimmermann (1995) as they move around in the community. Over this time period, it is assumed that the more nodes (or in a social context "friends") that the node has met, it is more trustworthy and well established in the community. Although the absolute number of nodes met is important, the number of nodes shared in common provides a more substantial metric for establishing initial trust. This mitigates the effect of a malicious node fabricating a large list of friends to falsify a higher trust rating.
The two properties, number of nodes met (N ) and number of common nodes (C), both increase the trust value. Decreasing trust value (D) is achieved during the comparison of common nodes. Key signatures, are compared of the common nodes for any discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, both nodes will decrease trust value with respect to each other. Nodes will take the default stance of completely trusting themselves, and assume their key instance as the correct key, whilst the neighbouring node has a false key. We assume that trust is diminished significantly faster than increasing trust.
The linear relationship between common contacts and acquaintances, and trust can be represented by the equation below:
The trust of Node A with respect to Node B T(A,B) is given by:
Where: t n is the trust weighting given to number of contacts. N is the number of nodes A has met. t c is the trust weighting given to the common contacts of Node A and Node B. C is the number of nodes in common with A and B. t d is the distrust weighting upon discovering a potential false key. D is the number of discrepancy keys between A and B. t neutral is the starting value of trust. Figure 3 depicts the public key exchange using the LCF trust system. Building on Jia et al. (2012) , Figure 3 shows the establishing initial trust stage is more comprehensive, requiring both nodes to send a list of direct contacts to each other. Trust is then computed based on these lists and the usual direct and carrier key exchange is carried out before disconnecting.
This reputation system is scalable and allows the introduction of new nodes into the community in the future. New nodes introduced will initially have a low trust rating, but as they meet and interact with established nodes, their trust rating will increase.
Simulation and Methodology
The authors of this paper have produced a DTN simulator in MATLAB. This simulator models the distribution of keys between nodes in a DTN using the web of trust methodology similar to Jia et al. (2012) . Random movement models for a predefined number of nodes and size of simulation space was generated. This movement model was recorded and re-used for each run of experiment to provide a controlled movement and node connection model. Nodes were initialised with a random starting XY co-ordinate, node ID and a randomly generated key signature. The simulation space is divided into squares. For each node at each time step, the simulator rolls a 9 sided die to determine whether the node should move into the eight adjacent squares or stay in the current square. This random model was used initially and additional movement models can be employed to provide more realistic DTN nodal movement. Nodes within a predefined communications range of another node may then connect to each other to engage in key exchange. Two properties that affect the trust system on the key distribution scheme are measured. The first is the key distribution efficiency or speed at which keys are distributed. This is measured by comparing the proposed leverage common friends trust system to the random trust system used in Jia et al. (2012) , and the control, where there is no trust system. The second is whether the trust system can provide any additional security to the key distribution scheme. This is measured by introducing a malicious node into the system and measuring which nodes accept malicious keys.
Experiments
Three scenarios, each using the different methods of establishing initial trust formed an experiment. The first called control, utilised a complete trust method. The second called random, utilised a random trust similar to Jia et al. (2012) . The third called common, utilised the new LCF method. For each experiment a random movement model was generated and replayed for all three scenarios, this allowed the same movement and connections to nodes to be replayed for each different method of establishing initial trust. It permitted the observation of how each methodology of establishing initial trust changed the rate of key distribution.
Each scenario was played out for a total of 10000 clock steps (τ ) with 100 nodes randomly assigned in a 100x100 square grid. A clock step represents a second. For each clock step, the nodes could travel a distance of 1 grid space and had a communications range of 1 grid space. When detecting a neighbouring node, it would engage in key exchange for a total of 60 seconds to simulate sufficient time to handshake, exchange keys using various key exchange protocols and transfer additional data such as messages. Jia et al. (2012) assumes a time of 120 seconds to be sufficient time to exchange keys between nodes. During this period, the two nodes would generate an initial trust value from one of the three methods, exchange their own keys, exchange keys in the direct keys list with each other that would become approved keys provided they met the trust threshold. Upon completion of exchanging keys, nodes would disconnect and resume movement.
The simulation has the ability to introduce a malicious node into the system. This is an insider attack model. The malicious node is assumed to have similar abilities as outlined in Dolev and Yao (1983) . The malicious node can obtain any message passing through the network, they are a user of the network and can therefore initiate communications with other nodes in the network, and they are also a receiver of communications. A node can be designated as a sleeper malicious node and turn bad at a given time stamp during the simulation designated as τ m . The node and time stamp can be defined by the user. When τ < τ m , the sleeper node behaves normally and interacts with other nodes, participating in the exchanging and distribution of keys, as shown in Figure 4a . However at τ = τ m shown in Figure 4b , the node flags an internal switch designating itself as malicious, regenerates a new malicious private/public key pair and replaces all the public keys of nodes in the direct and approved list as its own key. It then proceeds to distribute its own malicious key and other false keys to nodes it meets at τ > τ m as seen in Figures 4c and 4d . In Figure 4c , The malicious node replaces the legitimate keys it has received with the malicious key. The other node receives instances of the malicious key, in two forms, first the malicious key attached to the malicious node identity, and the second being the malicious key attached to a legitimate node identity. This simulates the scenario of a malicious outsider compromising a member of the community. The spread of false keys is detrimental to the security of the network. Nodes may pass messages using falsified keys of the unsuspecting receiver. These false keys then allow the malicious node to eavesdrop on network traffic and impersonate other nodes.
A malicious node was introduced into the simulation at τ = 200. This value was chosen to reflect the scenario where an attacker compromises a node shortly after deployment. Node 100 was designated as the malicious node and at 200 clock steps would change all the keys in the direct and approved list to the malicious key 0xBAD (101110101101). The malicious node would then continue to spread these malicious keys and upon meeting another node, transfer the malicious key, accept the neighbouring nodes key and proceed to change it to 0xBAD. This is essentially a key spoof attack. The introduction of the malicious node is a simulated event of an attacker compromising a node of the system. Table 1 provides a summary of the simulation parameters. For the random and common scenarios, the trust threshold for approved keys was set at a value of 1.1. The random scenario generated a trust value between 0 and 1, as to ensure a carried key had to be received by a minimum of two nodes to allow approval. The common scenario parameters were set with the initial starting value (t neutral ) at 0.5 to reflect a neutral trust value. The constant t n reflecting the weighting given for number of contacts is set to 0.01. This was set by the authors of this paper to reflect that a 0.1 point increase in trust should occur for every 10 friends that the node has. The weighting for t c , was set at 0.025 to reflect that for generating trust, common friends are more important than the quantity of friends. The constant was set to reflect a 0.25 point increase in trust for every 10 common friends. In setting a value for both t n and t c , 10 friends represented 10 percent of the node population in the simulation. The distrust weighting (t d ) for having a false key in possession was heavily weighted at 0.25 to reflect that it is easier for a node to distrust than to trust. Node 100 Malicious Node Introduction (τ m ) τ = 200 Malicious Node Key 101110101101 In total, six experiments were run, each with three scenarios. Due to the random nature of the random scenario, this scenario was run three times for each experiment, and an average was taken. Figure 5 depicts the placement of the nodes in the simulation space. The X and Y axis depicting the XY co-ordinate position of the nodes, and the Z-axis depicting the number of keys in the direct and approved list. It shows a uniformly distributed placement and movement of nodes in the simulation. However due to the randomness of initial node placement, this may not always occur.
Results
Key distribution was an important metric to measure, allowing the observation of how efficient keys were distributed amongst nodes of the DTN. Figure 6 depicts the average key distribution for each scenario over time.
For each of the experiments involving malicious nodes, three metrics were used to determine the effectiveness and behaviour of the reputation system. The first looked at the number of keys the malicious node was able to obtain from both the direct and approved key lists. Since the same movement pattern was replayed for all three scenarios, resulting in the same node meetings occurring, the direct key list would be identical for the control, random and common scenarios. However the approved key list would differ due to differing trust systems between the scenarios. The second metric is the number of other nodes that have received the key of the malicious node (KeyID: Node 100, Key: 101110101101) in either their direct or approved list. Again since the movement model is the same for all three scenarios, it was expected that the direct key list would be identical between the scenarios. However the approved key list would differ based on the reputation system. The third metric measures the number of falsified keys. That is keys that have a non malicious owner but have a malicious key entry from the malicious node (KeyID: Node 75, Key: 101110101101). These keys pose the larger threat to secure communications in the DTN as it allows the malicious node to eavesdrop on messages as they are routed through a store-carry and forward scheme (Guo et al., 2010) . Table 2 shows the penetration of the malicious key in the system for a typical experiment, and Table 3 depicts the averaged results for all six experiments. The summation of these three metrics can be measured over time. Figure 7 depicts the average of all six experiments to show the distribution of malicious keys over time. 
Discussion
Results from the experiments focused on the efficiency of key distribution, and the number of malicious keys distributed for each scenario. Figure 6 depicts the key distribution of both direct and approved keys for each scenario. It shows that the control scenario provides the fastest key distribution with after 10000 time steps each node averaging 100 keys. This indicates that each node has either met or is aware through other nodes all other 99 nodes in the simulation and can communicate with them. The random and common scenarios show a slower but still effective key distribution. It is interesting to note that the random scenario was slower than the common scenario. This is due to that fact that the LCF, resulted in a more relevant initial trust value and a trustworthy distribution of keys in comparison to a randomly generated trust value in the random scenario. This is evident when analysing the time taken for each scenario to distribute 50% of the keys. The control scenario distributed 50% of the keys after approximately 2500 time steps, the fastest of all three scenarios. The common scenario distributed the same amount of keys after approximately 3600 time steps, whilst the random scenario took the longest requiring approximately 4200 seconds to distribute 50% of the keys.
Key Distribution Efficiency
When compared to Jia et al. (2012) , the random scenarios indicate that our results distribute more keys after the same number of time steps. This is likely because of differing simulation engines. Jia et al. (2012) utilise the NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) simulator, whilst the authors of this paper have produced a fully customisable DTN simulator in MATLAB. Movement models although both are considered random, is not defined by Jia et al. (2012) as whether it is random or random waypoint (Johnson and Maltz, 1996) , where nodes randomly generate a destination, path and speed. In this experiment, the direction was randomly generated, but the speed was kept at a constant 1 grid space per clock step. Table 2 shows that using the random method to establish initial trust, provides little or no additional security compared to the control scenario, for the prevention of malicious keys being distributed. Some experiments (see appendix) show that more malicious keys are approved for the random scenario at the end of the simulation than the control scenario. Because the malicious node is introduced after 200 time steps, the sleeper malicious node has the ability to distribute a set of un-compromised keys before turning bad. In the control scenario, these keys are spread quickly as there is no reputation system for accepting carried keys. As a result, once the malicious node is activated and distributing the malicious key, there are two different keys associated with the malicious node. One key belonging to the node before it went bad, and one after. The good key displaced some of the nodes that may receive the bad key later on. Since these nodes already have a key instance of the malicious node, it does not require another instance and rejects the malicious key.
Malicious Key Distribution
The first metric is the number of keys that the malicious node was able to obtain and falsify, or bad node with bad keys (Tables 2 and 3 ). Both the control and random scenarios showed similar results as seen from the averaged results in Table 3 . For the number of approved keys, both the random and control scenarios had on average 53.67 and 53.33 keys respectively. However, looking at the approved key list for the random scenario, it uncovered that many keys were approved later in the simulation as trust values were aggregated from various sources. Therefore as the simulation progressed, it became easier to approve carried keys. However, for the common scenario, nearly all experiments showed poor results in obtaining carried keys from sources averaging 3.83 keys in Table 3 . This can be explained through the design of the reputation system employed.
During the process of examining common contacts, the node will check the neighbouring nodes direct list of nodes and key signatures. If they are identical, the trust value is incremented, however if the key signatures of the node is different, the trust value is decreased significantly. This is designed to establish a low initial trust value for nodes that carry false keys. Due to the lack of a centralised key manager or reputation system, the only method of checking whether the node is carrying false keys is to compare key signatures of nodes in common to both nodes. Since the node assumes that itself is a trustworthy source, if there is a discrepancy in the signature, it will assume the other node is carrying a false key. The malicious node carries multiple faked keys that itself regards as correct and fully trustworthy. Therefore if it meets another node with genuinely correct keys, it will assume that the other node is spreading false keys and degrade the trust rating. With the introduction of multiple malicious nodes, it is expected to segregate the network into the two groups of un-compromised and malicious nodes.
The second metric is the number of nodes that have approved the malicious key, or good nodes with bad keys (Tables 2 and 3 ). The results indicate that both the random and common scenarios provide little security in preventing this. Table 3 shows an average of the six experiments that the control scenario having 44 malicious keys distributed as a reference. The random and common scenarios distributed slightly more malicious keys averaging 47.78 and 48.17 respectively. In particular for the common scenario, the malicious key is spread by un-compromised nodes that have directly met the malicious node, taken on the malicious key in their direct list, and then spread them to other un-compromised nodes through the approval process. Since the common scenario is designed to establish a more appropriate initial trust value, the malicious key is still spread slightly better than both the control and random scenarios. Practically, this is an acceptable result as it allows the malicious key, owned by the malicious node, to be disseminated through the network. In the future, if the network allows distributed revocation, each node can flag the malicious node as compromised and handle the key accordingly.
False Key Distribution
The third metric looks at the number of false keys that the malicious node has distributed. These keys have the Node ID belonging to a un-compromised node, however the key itself is the malicious key. From the experiments, it is evident that only the common reputation system successfully mitigates the distribution of false keys, averaging 6 falsified keys as shown in Table 3 . This is effective as the system segregates the network into un-compromised and malicious nodes. The random scenarios show little to no effect on mitigating the spread of false keys, and in some experiments, performed worse than the control scenario. The random scenarios averaged 53.22 falsified keys which was higher than the control scenario of 50.67 falsified keys. The mitigation of distribution of false keys by a malicious node is imperative to provide secure communications in such a network. Distribution of false keys allow the malicious node to eavesdrop on communications and allow the impersonation of the victim node. The results show that the malicious node is segregated through trust by other uncompromised nodes in the common scenario, with a low acceptance of falsified keys. Further improvements to the LCF trust system can come in the form of allowing the trust value of each node to be modified upon meeting again, or a decaying trust value as time increases. The malicious key distribution over time in Figure 7 shows that the common scenario mitigates a significant amount of malicious keys introduced by one compromised node.
The total malicious key distribution over time depicted in Figure 7 , shows that the common scenario distributed 40% less malicious keys at the end of the simulation than the control and random scenarios. It also shows that the distribution of malicious keys flattens out after 7000 to 8000 time steps. Variations in the results are evident in the random scenarios for each experiment. Although the movement model was replayed for each scenario, the initial trust value when two nodes meet in the random scenario was randomly generated. Replaying each simulation would result in variations of approved key lists due to the random trust value. This coupled with the introduction of the malicious node after 200 time steps caused variations between experiments as to the spread of un-compromised keys of the malicious node before 200 time steps. However this was necessary to reflect a node being compromised after deployment.
Conclusion
This paper utilised the introduction of a single malicious node into a DTN to measure the effectiveness of different trust systems. Using a key distribution scheme similar to Jia et al. (2012) , which is based on the Web of Trust principle (Zimmermann, 1995) , for areas with no centralised PKI or trust system is an effective mechanism of distributing keys. It also shows that the implementation of an autonomous system that establishes the initial trust between the nodes presents security challenges normally managed by the centralised third party. Three implementations of a trust system were simulated to determine their effectiveness at mitigating the distribution of a malicious key introduced by a compromised node. The control scenario of having no trust system to distribute carried keys provided a base metric on measuring the effectiveness of a reputation system. The second implementation similar to Jia et al. (2012) , used a randomly generated value when two nodes come within communications range. This implementation was not successful in preventing the distribution of the malicious key. The third implementation was the LCF trust system amongst the two nodes. Initial trust was established based on the number of contacts, number of contacts in common and the validity of the keys. This implementation provided a more useful trust value for nodes with no prior history without a centralised reputation manager. This implementation also provided an effective mitigation in malicious key distribution, particular in the distribution of faked keys.
The results indicate that in autonomous DTN systems, implementation of a distributed trust system based on common contacts improved key distribution in comparison to the control or random scenarios. This trust system also contributed to mitigating the distribution of false and malicious keys between nodes by 40% at the end of the simulation. In particular the number of falsified keys was significantly reduced from an average of 50.67 keys in the control scenario to 6 keys in the common scenario.
Improvements and future work include looking at the introduction of multiple malicious nodes to the network. This will help examine the effectiveness of repelling a multiple malicious nodal attack. The introduction of different reputation systems is also to be considered. The ability for the reputation system to provide distributed and automated (unmanaged) revocation requires further investigation. Improvements in the random movement model to incorporate a random way-point model (Johnson and Maltz, 1996) is also an area requiring further investigation.
